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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 23, Sheet 1
No. 80-2162

/3 from NM Ct App

RAMAH NAVA~OOL
BOARD IN.~ al.

(Wood,

~ernandez, Andrews)

-~

v.

NEW MEXICO BUREAU OF
REVENUE

Timely

State/Civil

SUMMARY: A.p pts arque that the state was l::eemptM from
taxing the gross receipts of a construction comoanv
by the
•• hired
L...:_:_:..:.;;,.--......._
Navajo Indians to build a school on its reservation.
FACTS:

~he

Navaio Indians received more than $9 million from

-

Congress to build a school on their reservation.

Appts note that

construction of the school was necessary bP.cause the state closed
a public high school in 1968, forcing Navajo youth to attend a
federal boarding school.
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The money was disbursed through the

Vu{t1 te
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lh
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F~t-aci:ef,
~
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-

Bureau of Indian Affairs.

2 -

The scho61 board entered into a cost-

plus contract with appt Lembke Construction Company, a non-Indian
company, which required the board to reimburse Lembke for anv
taxes.

New Mexico collected about $232,000 in taxes on Lembke's

gross receipts.

~he

Navaios claim this has prevented completion

of the school facilities.
DECISION BELOW:

The ~M

Ct. of Apo. affirmed a trial court's

decision that the state had authority to tax the construction
company's gross receipts.

The court's reasoning was that the

legal incidence of the tax was on Lembke rather than the Navaios.
It relied upon Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskev, 625 F.2d 967
(lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3619 (Feb. 23, 1981).
In O'Cheskey a divided CAlO en bane upheld New Mexico's authority
to collect its gross receipts tax from a contractor building a
hotel and recreational facility on a reservation.

The NM Ct. of

App. denied a motion for a rehearing to consider this Court's
decisions
448
448

u.s.
u.s.

i~Central

Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,

160 (1980), and
136 (1980).

~hite

Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,

The NM Sup. Ct. granted a writ of

certiorari but then quashed it as improvidently granted.
CONTENTIONS: Appts argue that New Mexico is preempted from
taxing the gross receipts of the construction project because the
tax conflicts with a comprehensive federal scheme to accomplish a
major national goal, the improvement of Indian education.

Appts

point to the 1868 Navajo Treaty which obligated the federal
government to provide schools and a 1969 congressional report
that termed Indian education "a national tragedy."

They further

argue that a necessary implication of the congressional
appropriations directing the BIA to provide a school for the

- 3 -

Navajos is that the appropriations were for construction costs
and not for paying state taxes.

And under Bracker, appts argue,

the state is preempted from collecting its tax because of the
pervasive federal involvement in the proiect.

Appts term the NM

Ct. of App.'s reliance on the "legal incidence" of fhe tax "a
mechanical application of a discredited labeling test •••• "
Resp contends that Bracker is distinguishable because the
federal involvement was more comprehensive.

Bracker involved

logging on a reservatjon, for which there are detailed federal
regulations, unlike construction of school buildings.

And in

Bracker the state tax was levied on a contractor who operated
exclusively on a reservation while Lembke constructs buildings
..../

throughout New ' Mexico.
persuasive.

Resp finds O'Cheskey on point and

It notes that the Apache resort considered in that

case was constructed with funds appropriated by Congress and
administered bv the Economic Development Administration.

It also

notes that Congress knows how to specifically designate
appropriations that the states may not tax and argues that
Congress either intended to allow New Mexico to tax the
appropriation for the Navaio school or had no intent on the
issue.
DISCUSSIO

'

may
(.

s ated that to determine whether a state

...

------....

on a reservation a court must make "a

.,

particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and
~

tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority
would violate federal law." 448 U.S. at 145.

The New Mexico

courts have not made a particularized inquiry but have instead
based their decision primarily on which party bore the le al

'.

-

~

•

incidence of the tax.

4 -

Such an approach, endorsed by CAlO in

O'Cheskey, seems contrary to Bracker.

~he

SG argued that the

Court should grant cert in O'Cheskey because application of a
legal incidence test gives no attention to federal and tribal
interests.

The federal ann tribal interests involved in this

case, Indian education, would appear to be at least as strong as
the interests involved in Bracker, logging on a reservation, and
much stronger than the interests involved in O'Cheskev,
construction of a resort.
I recommend CVSG with an eye toward NPJ or perhaps a summary
reversal.
~here

8/31/81

is a response.

Wright

Op in Petn

The Navajo argue in reply tha comprehensive federal
regulations do cover this project
Moreover preemption may be
invoked here in any event. The
ate tax frustrates the federal
purpose of improving Indian educ tion. Since the N~ ty
has been found to preempt a
·~~e~ ax--McClanahan v.
Arizona, 411 U.S. 1
(1973)-- rely it must also preempt a state
tax which burdens an objective explicitly stated in the treaty:
education of the Navajo.
I don't think that McCl nahan is directly on point since the
state tax here is levie on the construction company--not the
tribe. But there is co si rable strength to their argument that
existence vel non of "co
ehensive federal regulations" is not
the only way to determin the federal intention to preempt.

The SG "reluctantly" urges the Court to note jurisdiction or grant
cert in this case. The courts below did not follow Bracker or Central
Machinery.
~
The SG suggests tha summary treatmegt will not be enough here. The
state courts are sim ly ignoring ~decisions of this Court. Moreover,
the court of appeals 1 purp~to distinguish Bracker and Wkixe
M~HHXRiH
Central Machinery.
Could we still GVR xRxxi~kxx~f for further consideration in light of
Bracker and Central Machinery? I think that is still the best course
rather than a full blown grant.
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Memorandum to Justice Powell
Bobtail memo on No. 80-2162, Ramah Navajo

Two years ago, you wrote separately in two cases.
That writing provides relevant guideposts for deciding this
case.
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448
U.S. 160 (1980), a company that had no license to trade with
Indians and no place of business on the reservation entered
the

reservation

The Court
sale.

to make a

(TM writing)

single

sale of

farm machinery.

held that Arizona could not tax that

You dissented, stressing that the single sale did not

interfere with the

statutory plan that Congress set up to

govern such transactions:
"Since a seller not licensed to trade with the
Indians must secure specific federal approval
for each isolated transaction, there is no
danger that ordinary state business taxes will
imparin the Bureau [of Indian Affair's] ability
to
prevent
fraudulent
or
excessive
pricing." Id., at 173.
In this course of this reasoning you quoted language stating that
taxes will not be invalidated if they do not "to a substantial
extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose

"

Id.

2.

In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980), the Court held that Arizona could not collect gas tax and
a gross receipts tax from a motor carrier operating on an Indian
reservation.
ations

are

You agreed, stating that the carrier's "daily opercontrolled

by

a

comprehensive

federal

regulatory

scheme designed to assure the Indian tribe the greatest possible
return from their timber."

!d., at 174.

I gather from these expressions that the key inquiry is
whether a

state tax substantially impairs comprehensive federal

regulatory scheme benefitting Indians.
is preempted.
emption, with

If so, then the state tax

This is in accord with general principles of prethe caveat that federal preemption in the

field will be found

somewhat more

White Mountain Apache, 448

u.s.,

Indian

readily than otherwise.

See

at 143 (opinion of TM).

Applying these principles to this case, I conclude Indi-

-

ans should win this fairly close case.

The SG lists the two rel-

evant federal statutes at pages 13-126 of his brief.
~

'

~

~

These stat-

utes authorize federal grants for the purpose of funding Indian
-----------------~~
education.
As part of this purpose, they also specify that the
--.,

Bureau of

Indian Affairs

construction agreements.

(BIA)

will

review and monitor

school

The regulations and BIA review in this

case made no provision for payment of state taxes. The SG's ba--------~~--------~---------------~
sic argument is that, in the absence of explicit federal approval
of such a state tax,

its payment will have the simple effect of

reducing the funds available to further the central federal purpose:

education of Indian children.

U4H•'4
~

3.
In

response,

New

Mexico

makes

two

central

arguments.

Its strongest is that calculations that included provisions for
the

NM tax

based

formed

the

its award of

basis

for

estimates

upon which Congress

Ramah Navajo construction funds.

potentially powerful argument.

I

This is a

think it would win if NM were

able to show that Congress had any actual knowledge that the estimates

included state taxes, or had Congress expressed any in-

tent to devote federal funds to the payment of state taxes.
fails, however, to make these showings.
ment

to

be only that

NM

I understand their argu-

the Ramah Board assumed at

first

that

it

would have to pay the tax, that the Board submitted its estimate
totals to Congress, and that Congress approved an award.

Appar-

ently

actual

at

no

point

did

the

federal

government

have

any

knowledge that the grant was designed to include sums devoted to
NM taxes.

Under these circumstances, I believe that the Indians

have the better argument that extraction of the taxes will reduce
a

federal grant that Congress did not intend to have reduced by

the payment of state taxes.

I do note, however, that reasonable

minds certainly could differ on this point.
The State • s
makes provision for
instances.

second argument

is that the federal

scheme

state provision of Indian schooling in some

The State concludes that collection of the state tax

cannot interfere with the federal scheme.

This argument is es-

sentially irrelevant, it seems to me, because this is nQt a situation in which the State has agreed to undertake the burdens of

4.

participating in Indian education.

If so, this would be a dif-

ferent case if it had -- a point that I believe the SG concedes.
In

conclusion,

I

think

the

Indians

have

succeeded

in

demonstrating that the federal Indian education statutes and regulations have the goal of maximizing Indian educational opportunities by means of

federal grants.

The purpose of this fairly

comprehensive federal scheme is infringed to a degree by the payment of state taxes out of the federal grant.

Although I do not

think that the argument is an overwhelming one, on balance I believe that the NM tax is preempted by federal law.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2162
RAMA~I

NAVAJO SCHOOL BOARD, INC., ET AL.,
APPELLANTS v. BUREAU OF REVENUE OF
NEW MEXICO

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
[June -

, 1982)

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we address the question whether federal law
pre-empts a state tax imposed on the gross receipts that a
non-Indian construction company receives from a tribal
school board for the construction of a school for Indian children on the reservation. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
held that the gross receipts tax imposed by the State of New
Mexico was permissible. Because the decision below is inconsistent with White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U. S. 136 (1980) (White Mountain), we reverse.
I
Approximately 2,000 members of the Ramah Navajo Chapter of the Navajo Indian Tribe live on tribal trust and allotment lands located in west central New Mexico. Ramah N avajo children attended a small public high school near the
reservation until the State closed this facility in 1968. Because there were no other public high schools reasonably
close to the reservation, the Ramah Navajo children were
forced either to abandon their high school education or to attend federal Indian boa~·ding schools far from the reservation. In 1970, the Ramah Navajo Chapter exercised its authority under Navajo Tribal Code, Title 10, §51, and
established its own school board in order to remedy this situ-

r·

~4.-?

4:1

~~
~)

J-~
~

-

80-2162-0PINION
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RAMAH NAVAJO SCH. BD. v. BUREAU OF REVENUE

ation. Appellant Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. (the
Board) was organized as a nonprofit corporation to be operated exclusively by members of the Ramah Navajo Chapter.
The Board is a Navajo "tribal organization" within the meaning of 25 U. S. C. § 450b(c), 88 Stat. 2204. With funds provided by the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the
Navajo Indian Tribe, the Board operated a school in the
abandoned public school facility, thus creating the first independent Indian school in modern times. 1
In 1972, the Board successfully solicited from Congress
funds for the design of new school facilities. Pub. L. 92-369,
86 Stat. 510. The Board then contracted with the BIA for
the design 'of the new school and hired an architect. In 1974,
the Board contracted with the BIA for the actual construction of the new school to be built on reservation land. Funding for the construction of this facility was provided by a series of congressional appropriations specifically earmarked
for this purpose. 2 The contract specified that the Board was
the design and building contractor for the project, but that
the Board could subcontract the actual construction work to
third parties. The contract furthered provided that any subcontracting agreement would have to include certain clauses
governing pricing, wages, bonding, and the like, and that it
must by approved by the BIA.
The Board then solicited bids from area building contractors for the construction of the school, and received bids from
'On July 8, 1970, in his Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs,
President Nixon referred specifically to these efforts of the Board to assume responsibility for the education of tribal children abandoned by the
State as a "notable example" of Indian self-determination. 6 Weekly
Comp. of Pres. Doc. 894, 899 (1970).
2
See Pub. L. 93-245, 87 Stat. 1073 (1973) (amending Pub. L. 93-120, 87
Stat. 431 (1973) to specifically earmark funds appropriated there for the
construction of the Ramah school facility); Pub. L. 93-404, 88 Stat. 810
(1974); Pub. L. 94-165, 89 Stat. 985 (1975); Pub. L. 95-74, 91 Stat. 293
(1977).

80-2162-0PINION
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two non-Indian firms. Each firm included the state gross receipts tax as a cost of construction in their bids, although the
tax was not itemized separately. Appellant Lembke Construction Company (Lembke) was the low bidder and was
awarded the contract. The contract between the Board and
Lembke provides that Lembke is to pay all "taxes required
by law." Lembke began construction of the school facilities
in 1974 and continued this work for over five years. During
that time, Lembke paid the gross receipts tax and, pursuant
to standard industry practice, was reimbursed by the Board
for the full amount paid. Before the second contract between Lembke and the Board was executed in 1977, a clause
was insert'ed into the contract recognizing that the Board
could litigate the validity of this tax and was entitled to any
refund.
Both Lembke and the Board protested the imposition of
the gross receipts tax. In 1979, after exhausting administrative remedies, they filed this refund action against appellee New Mexico Bureau of Revenue in the New Mexico District Court. At the time of trial, the parties stipulated that
the Board had reimbursed Lembke for tax payments of
$232,264.38 and that the Board would receive any refund that
might be awarded.
The trial court entered judgment for the State Bureau of
Revenue. After noting that the "legal incidence" of the tax
fell on the non-Indian construction firm, the court rejected
appellants' arguments that the tax was pre-empted by comprehensive federal regulation and that it imposed an impermissible burden on tribal sovereignty. The Court of Appeals
for the State of New Mexico affirmed. Although ackno\vledging that the economic burden of the tax fell on the Board,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax was not preempted by federal law and that it did not unlawfully burden
tribal sovereignty. Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc . v.
Bureau of Revenue, State of New Mexico, 95 N.M. 708, 625
P. 2d 1225 (N.M. App. 1980), cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 17, 627

80-2162-0PINION
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P. 2d 412 (1981). The Board filed a petition for rehearing in
light of this Court's intervening decisions in White Mountain,
supTa, and Centml Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Comm., 448 U. S. 160 (1980). The Court of Appeals denied
the petition, stating only that this case did not involve either
"a comprehensive or pervasive scheme of federal regulation"
or "federal regulation similar to the Indian trader statutes."
*[Cite if published]. After initially granting discretionary
review, the New Mexico Supreme Court quashed the writ as
improvidently granted. 96 N.M. 17, 627 P. 2d 412 (1981).
We noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - .
II

In recent years, this Court has often confronted the difficult problem of reconciling "the plenary power of the States
over residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations."
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U. S.
164, 165 (1973). Although there is no definitive formula for
resolving the question whether a State may exercise its authority over tribal members or reservation activities, we
have recently identified the relevant federal, tribal, and state
interests to be considered in determining whether a particular exercise of state authority violates federal law. See
White Mountain, 448 U. S., at 141-145.

A
In White
Mountain, we recognized that the federal and
""-.
tribal interests a?ise from the broad power of Congress to
regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and from the semi-autonomous status of Indian Tribes. 448 U. S., at 142. These interests tend to
erect two "independent but related" barriers to the exercise
of state authority over commercial activity on an Indian reservation: state authority may be pre-empted by federal law,
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or it may interfere with the Tribe's ability to exercise its sovereign functions. Ibid. (citing, inter alia, WaTren Tmding
Post Co. v. A1-izona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra; and Williams
. S. 217 (1959)). As we explained in
e two barriers are independent because either,
standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state
law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members. They are related, however,
in two important ways. The right of tribal self-government i.s ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad
power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an important "backdrop," ... against which vague or ambiguous federal
enactments must always be measured." I d., at 143
(quoting McClanahan v. A1-izona State Tax Comm'n,
supra, at 172).
The State's interest in exercising its regulatory a1,1thority _ '
over the activity in question m'u st be examined and given appropriate weight. Pre-emption analysis in this area is not
controlled by "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or
tribal sovereignty;" it requires a particularized examination
of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests. I d., at
145. The question whether federal law, which reflects the
related federal and tribal interests, pre-empts the State's exercise of its regulatory authority is not controlled by standards of pre-emption developed in other areas. I d., at
143-144. Instead, the traditional notions of tribal sovereignty, and the recognition and encouragement of this sovereignty in congressional Acts promoting tribal independence
and economic development, inform the pre-emption analysis
that governs this inquiry. See id., at 143 and n. 10. Relevant federal statutes and treaties must be examined in light
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of "the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
tribal independence." I d., at 144-145. As a result, ambiguities in federal law should be construed generously, and federal pre-emption is not limited to those situations where Congress has explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state
activity. Id., at 143-144, 150-151.
In White Mountain, we applied these principles and held
that federal law pre-empted application of the state motor
carrier license and use fuel taxes to a non-Indian logging company's activity on tribal land. We found the federal regulatory scheme for harvesting Indian timber to be so pervasive
that it precluded the imposition of additional burdens by the
relevant state taxes. I d., at 148. The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) had promulgated detailed regulations for
the purpose of developing "'Indian forests by the Indian people for the purpose of promoting self-sustaining communities."' Id., at 147 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
Under these regulations, the BIA was involved in virtually
every aspect of the produc.tion and marketing of Indian timber. Id., at 145-148. In particular, the Secretary and the . ', ,.,,.,'
BIA extensively regulated the contractual relationship between the Indians and the non-Indians working on the reservation: they established the bidding procedure, set mandatory terms to be included in every contract, and required that
all contracts be approved by the Secretary. Id., at 147.
We found that the the state taxes in question would
"threaten the overriding federal objective of guaranteeing
Indians that they will 'receive ... the benefit of whatever
profit [the forest] is capable of yielding ... . "' I d., at 149
(quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)). We concluded that
the imposition of state taxes would also undermine the Secretary's ability to carry out his obligations to set fees and rates
for the harvesting and sale of the timber, and it would impede
the "Tribe's ability to comply with the sustained-yield management policies imposed by federal law." Id., at 149-150.

,, I
, I

I
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Balanced against this intrusion into the federal scheme, the
State asserted only "a general desire to raise revenue" as its
justification for imposing the taxes. I d., at 150. In this
context, this interest is insufficient to justify the State's intrusion into a sphere so heavily regulated by the Federal
Government. Ibid.
B
This case is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from
White Mountain. Federal regulation of the construction and
financing of Indian educational institutions is both comprehensive and pervasive. The Federal Government's concern
with the education of Indian children can be traced back to
the first treaties between the United States and the Navajo
Tribe. 3 Since that time, Congress has enacted numerous
statutes empowering the BIA to provide for Indian education
both on and off the reservation. See, e. g., Snyder Act, 42
Stat. 208, 25 U. S. C. § 13 (1921); Johnson-O'Malley Act, 48
Stat. 596, 25 U. S. C. § 452 et seq. (1934); Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, 64 Stat. 44, 25 U. S. C. § 631 et seq. (1950);
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88
Stat. 2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq. (1975) (Self-Determination Act). Although the early focus of the federal efforts in
this area concentrated on providing federal or state educational facilities for Indian children, in the early 1970's the federal policy shifted toward encouraging the development of Indian-controlled institutions on the reservation.
See 6
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 894, 899-900 (Message of Pres.
Nixon)
This federal policy has been codified in the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and
Article VI of the 1868 Treaty between the United States and the Navajo Tribe, 15 Stat. 669, provides that "[i]n order to insure the civilization
of the Indians entering into this treaty, the necessity of education is
admitted."
3
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most notably in the Self-Determination Act. The SelfDetermination Act declares that a "major national goal of the
United States is to provide the quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities which will permit Indian
children to compete and excel in the life areas of their choice,
and to achieve the measure of self-determination essential to
their social and economic well-being." 88 Stat. 2003, as set
forth in 25 U. S. C. 450a(c). In achieving this goal, Congress expressly recognized that "parental and community
control of the educational process is of crucial importance to
the Indian people." 88 Stat. 2003, as set forth in 25 U. S. C.
§ 450(b)(3).
Section 450k empowers the Secretary to promulgate regulations to accomplish the purposes of the Act. 88 Stat. 2212,
25 U. S. C. § 450k. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary ha~ promulgated detailed and comprehensive regulations respecting "school construction for previously private
schools now controlled and operated by tribes or tribally approved Indian organizations." 25 CFR § 274.1 (1975).
Under these regulations, the BIA has wide-ranging authority
to monitor and review the subcontracting agreements between the Indian organization, which is viewed as the general contractor, and the non-Indian firm that actually constructs the facilities.
See 25 CFR § 274. 2 (1975). 4
Specifically, the BIA must conduct preliminary on-site inspections, and prepare cost estimates for the project in cooperation with the tribal organization. 25 CFR § 274.22
(1975). The Board must approve any architectural or engi'Although these regulations did not become effective until several
n,, ths after the BIA and the Board had executed the initial contracts, the
Se-:>· tary and the BIA had applied similar requirements under the authority of the Johnson-O'Malley Act, 48 Stat. 496, 25 U. S. C. § 452 et seq. In
any event, the two subsequent agreements between the BIA, the Board
and Lembke, accounting for two-thirds of the total construction, were
signed after the effective date of these regulations, which clearly authorize
the BIA to monitor these construction agreements.

80--2162---0PINION
RAMAH NAVAJO SCH. BD. v. BUREAU OF REVENUE

9

neering agreements executed in connection with the project.
25 CFR § 274.32(c) (1975). In addition, the regulations empower the BIA to require that all subcontracting agreements
contain certain terms, ranging from clauses relating to bonding and pay scales, 41 CFR § 14H-70.632 (1975), to preferential treatment for Indian workers. 25 CFR § 274.38 (1975).
Finally, to ensure that the Tribe is fulfilling its statutory obligations, the regulations require the tribal organization to
maintain records for the Secretary's inspection. 25 CFR
§ 274.41 (1975).
This detailed regulatory scheme governing the construction of autonomous Indian educational facilities is at least as
comprehensive as the federal scheme found to be pre-emptive
in White Mountain. The direction and supervision provided
by the Federal Government for the construction of Indian
schools leaves no room for the additional burden sought to be
imposed by the State through its taxation of the gross receipts paid to Lembke by the Board. This burden, although
nominally falling on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily
impedes the clearly expressed federal interest in promoting
the "quality and quantity" of educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the funds available for the construction of
Indian schools. 6
• The Bureau invites us to adopt the "legal incidence" test, under which
the legal incidence and not the actual burden of the tax would control the
pre-emption inquiry. Of course, in some contexts, the fact that the legal
incidence of the tax falls on a non-Indian is significant. See Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 447 U. S. 134, 150--151 (1980); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976). However, in White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 151 (1980), we found it significant that the
economic burden of the asserted taxes would ultimately fall on the Tribe,
even though the legal incidence of the tax was on the non-Indian logging
company. Given the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme at issue
here, we decline to allow the State to impose additional burdens on the significant federal interest in fostering Indian-run educational institutions,
even if those burdens are imposed indirectly through a tax on a non-Indian
contractor for work done an the reservation.
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The Bureau of Revenue argues that imposition of the state
tax is not pre-empted because the federal statutes and regulations do not specifically express the intention to pre-empt
this exercise of state authority. This argument is clearly
foreclosed by our precedents. In White Mountain we flatly
rejected a similar argument. 448 U. S., at 150- 151 (citing
Wan·en Trading Post Co. v. A1-izona Tax Comm'n, supra;
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1958); and Kenerly v. Dist1-ict Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971)). There is
nothing unique in the nature of a gross receipts tax or in the
federal laws governing the development of tribal self-sufficiency in the area of education that requires a different
analysis. '
In this case, the State does not seek to assess its tax in return for the governmental functions it provides to those who
must bear the burden of paying this tax. Having declined to
take any responsibility for the education of these Indian children, the State is precluded from imposing an additional burden on the comprehensive federal scheme intended to provide
this education-a scheme which has "left the State with no
duties or responsibilities." Wan·en Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. at 691. 6 Nor has the State asserted any specific, legitimate regulatory interest to justify
the imposition of its gross receipts tax. The only arguably
specific interest advanced by the State is that it provides
services to Lembke for its activities off the reservation. This
interest, however, is not a legitimate justification for a tax
6
Of course, these statutes and regulations do not displace the States
from providing for the education of Indian children within their boundaries. Indeed, the Self-Determination Act specifically authorizes the Secretary to enter into contracts with any State willing to construct educational institutions for Indian children on or near the reservation. 88 Stat.
2214, 25 U. S. C. § 458. This case would be different if the State were
actively seeking tax revenues for the purpose of constructing, or assisting
in the effort to provide, adequate educational facilities for Ramah Navajo
children.
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whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal organization. Furthermore, although the State may confer substantial benefits
on Lembke as a state contractor, we fail to see how these
benefits can justify a tax imposed on the construction of
school facilities on tribal lands pursuant to a contract between the tribal organization and the non-Indian contracting
firm. 7 The New Mexico gross receipts tax is intended to
compensate the State for granting "the privilege of engaging
in business." N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-9-3.F and 7-9-4.A
(Repl. Pamph. 1980). New Mexico has not explained the
source of its power to levy such a tax in this case where the
"privilege of doing business" on an Indian reservation is exclusively oestowed by the Federal Government.
The State's ultimate justification for imposing this tax
amounts to nothing more than a general desire to increase
revenues. This purpose, as we held in White Mountain, 448
U. S., at 150, is insufficient to justify the additional burdens
imposed by the tax on the comprehensive federal scheme
regulating the creation and maintenance of educational
opportunities for Indian children and on the express federal
policy of encouraging Indian self-sufficiency in the area of
education. 8 This regulatory scheme precludes any state tax
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S. 160
(1980), we held that the Indian trader statutes, 19 Stat. 200, 25 U. S. C.
§ 261 et seq., pre-empted the State's jurisdiction to tax the sale of farm machinery to the Indian Tribe, notwithstanding the substantial services that
the State undoubtedly provided to the off-reservation activities of the nonIndian seller. Presumably, the state tax revenues derived from Lembke's
off-reservation business activities are adequate to reimburse the State for
the services it provides to Lembke.
8
We are similarly unpersuaded by the State's argument that the significant services it provides to the Ramah Navajo Indians justify the imposition of this tax. The State does not suggest that these benefits are in any
way related to the construction of schools on Indian land. Furthermore,
the evidence introduced below by the State on this issue is far from clear.
Although the State does provide services to the Ramah Navajo Indians, it
receives federal funds for providing some of these services, and the State
7
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that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 u. s. 52, 67 (1941).

c
The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of
the United States, suggests that we modify our pre-emption
analysis and rely on the dormant Indian Commerce Clause,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident Tribe are presumptively beyond the reach of
state law even in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, thus placing the burden on the State to demonstrate
that its intrusion is either condoned by Congress or justified
by a compelling need to protect legitimate, specified state interests other than the generalized desire to collect revenue.
He argues that adopting this approach is preferable for several reasons: it would provide guidance to the state courts addressing these issues, thus reducing the need for our case-bycase review of these decisions; it would avoid the tension
created by focusing on the pervasiveness of federal regulation as a principle barrier to State assertions of authority
when the primary federal goal is to encourage tribal selfdetermination and self-government; and it would place a
higher burden on the State to articulate clearly its particularized interests in taxing the transaction and to demonstrate
the services it provides in assisting the taxed transaction.
We do not believe it necessary to adopt this new approach-the existing pre-emption analysis governing these
cases is sufficiently sensitive to many of the concerns expressed by the Solicitor General. Although clearer rules and
presumptions promote the interest in simplifying litigation,
our precedents announcing the parameters of pre-emption
analysis in this area provide sufficient guidance to state
conceded at trial that it saves approximately $380,000 by not having to provide education for the Ramah Navajo children. App. 95, 105-106, 108.
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courts and also allow for more flexible consideration of the
federal, state, and tribal interests at issue. We have consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relating to Tribes and tribal activities must be "construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of
[Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence." White Mountain, supra, 448
U. S., at 144; see also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 174-175 and n. 13 (1973); Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U. S., at
690-691. This guiding principle helps relieve the tension between emphasizing the pervasiveness of federal regulation
and the federal policy of encouraging Indian self-determination. Although we must admit our disappointment that the
courts below apparently gave short shrift to this principle
and to our precedents in this area, we cannot and do not presume that state courts will not follow both the letter and the
spirit of our decisions in the future .

III
In sum, the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme and
the express federal policy of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency in the area of education preclude the imposition of the
state gross receipts tax in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the New Mexico Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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